Effects of Illicit Crops and Illegal Drug Markets on Forests and People

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Effects of Illicit Crops and Illegal Drug Markets on Forests and People

Juan Lopez and Frederick Cubbage, North Carolina State University


Illicit crops and illegal markets for drugs are one of the crucial issues affecting forests and rural people in producer countries. Income, health, education and stability in rural areas are required as well as some forms of employment and government support and control. Where employment and legal productive opportunities are lacking, which is common in remote forests, illegal opportunities provide a means for poor people to survive, often with a higher income in the short run, but with more risk and oppression from criminals. This entry examines the environmental, economic, and social issues involved with illegal activities and drugs, with particular examples from Colombia, which is an important player in this sector in the Americas. Development and implementation of long term strategic plans and government policies are required to improve the conservation of forests, and economic and social stability of rural communities. Permanent coordinated efforts between consumer and producer countries are necessary in the war against the illegal drug business. Plan Colombia is illustrated as a common effort between the governments of the U.S. and Colombia.


Markets


Huge economic profits are the main driver of most illicit businesses. There is a large market in the U.S. and Europe for illegal drugs produced in developing countries. According to the Office of National Drug Control Policy, expenditures on cocaine and heroin accounted for 70% of the total value of the trade in illicit substances in the U.S. in the latter part of the 1990s, $36 billion on cocaine, and $10 billion on heroin. These figures are given for the market retail value paid by the final consumer. The costs to society in the U.S. from drug consumption however, exceed the amounts spent on drug abuse. The public bears much of the burden of indirect costs because it finances the criminal justice response to drug-related crime, a public drug-treatment system, and anti-drug prevention programs (9).


Reuter and Greenfield (13) compared the value added of legal agricultural products and illicit crops in developed and developing countries in 2001. They found similarities in farm value share of frozen fresh fried potatoes in the U.S. and opium in Pakistan. In both cases the farm gate value is close to 10% of the retail value in domestic markets. They also established similarities with products like Colombian coffee and cocaine within the U.S. market. For both finished products the value added in the U.S. is between 80% and 90% of the retail value. Cross-border shipping is one of the largest differences in the distribution of value added in the illegal drug industry. According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration, the price of one kilogram of pure cocaine for export in Colombia is US$1,050. Once this kilo is placed in Miami, its price goes up to US$23,000, an increase of 2100%.


Caulkins and Reuter (15) note that wholesale prices for cocaine and heroin in developing nations are less than 1% of retail prices in the U.S. Because disputes between sellers and buyers cannot be managed through legal action, many of the conflicts are solved through violence. The high value per unit weight and the large quantities sold are the main incentives for violence, whether to protect territories or punish cheating (15).


The largest producer and exporter nation of cocaine in the world is Colombia. It is also the country with the largest area of coca plantings, followed by Bolivia and Peru. México and Colombia are the major Latin American producers and exporters of heroin to the U.S. Both nations have extensive areas with poppy plantings.


The development of marketing activities of cocaine in Colombia is part of the recent history of the country. In the mid 70s, some groups of dealers started the illegal business of growing cocaine, importing paste from Bolivia and Peru, chemical agents for its refinement, and processing and exporting cocaine to mainly the U.S. As a result of the successful illegal traffic business, the coca plantings increased significantly in the country; from 37,500 ha in early 1991 to more than 150,000 ha in 2000. Colombia is now the largest exporter of cocaine to the U.S., supplying more than 80% of the drug consumed in the U.S.


As depicted by Thomi (10), the estimate for the value added of illegal drugs in Colombia during the 1990s was $2.5 billion dollars per year, without including possible profits repatriated by Colombian traffickers abroad. Even though this figure is only between 3% and 4% of the total value for consumption of illicit drugs in the U.S., it is still very significant, and especially for the economy of Colombia.


Contributing Factors


The combination of the following factors might create the ideal conditions for the successful establishment of illegal crops and fast growth of cocaine business in Colombia, with the destruction of forests as a consequence.


Environmental conditions and cultural practices


Adequate environmental conditions for coca (Erithroxylum coca) and poppy (Papaver somniferum L.) plantings growth are required. These plants grow well in poor soils and typical climate conditions of tropical countries. These species do not adapt to countries of the Temperate zone. The traditional use of the coca leaves by some native cultures in these countries is a common practice in their daily lives.Some autonomous communities allow coca leaf consumption in their internal laws and regulations under certain restrictions.


Poverty and Economics


Poverty forces parents to make their children to work to survive. In rural areas of Colombia 87% of boys and 50% of girls at the ages of 10 and 11 years old are agricultural workers. On average, they work 12 to 15 hours daily. The 70% of child laborers in the agricultural sector perform high risk occupations. Out of every 10 workers under the age of 18, 7 will never attend any form of school. These are losing their physical and mental development potential. Especially unacceptable is the drop out rate of children under the age of 14, which continues to feed the country’s poverty (11). Poverty can be viewed as a cause and a consequence of illegal activities in rural areas of Colombia, making part of this vicious circle.


The high income and profits resulting from illegal sales of cocaine and heroin have propelled the establishment of coca and poppy plantings in Colombia’s countryside to alleviate this poverty. Part of this money goes to the peasants who grow these crops. The internal rate of return cited y Gonzalez (8) for coca plantings is more than 114% for the two varieties. Other advantages over traditional crops are the guaranteed purchase of the leaves, permanent prices in the market, and sale at the farm gate without taking risks and costs of transportation.


Violence


The illegal nature of the business brings violence as a way to solve disputes within the players of this market. The long history of violence in Colombia since the 1940s till the present represents a precedent that typifies business management in the illegal drug trade. The drug cartels as well as the armed groups, main protagonists of this business in Colombia, use violence as a modus operandi. Forty-one percent of the guerilla’s (FARC and ELN) income in Colombia, which ranged from $370 to $680 million dollars per year between 1991 and 1996, came from the illegal drug business (14). Kidnapping and extortion are other forms of crime used as funding sources by these groups. The propensity to use violence against other smuggling organizations induced Colombians to participate in all stages of the cocaine industry and to deter the development of export syndicates in Bolivia and Peru (10). It is no wonder that violence is considered the most important obstacle to the economic, social and political development of Colombia (World Bank 1999, cited by Alvarez (6)).


Government


Protection and administration of the public property is not possible with weak government institutions managing limited resources, high corruption levels, and poor implementation of natural resource policies. Illegal activities are affected by corruption and illicit crops are not an exception. The acts of corruption in the forestry sector deteriorate the government apparatus, one that is highly critical in a sector that generates many social and environmental impacts. Corruption of employees at all levels has weakened the integrity of many government institutions.


The lack of long term agrarian policies with sound technical, economic and social strategies has brought high levels of poverty to a large proportion of Colombians in the rural areas. Historical investment in the countryside has been very low, and the basic needs for food, housing, health, and education are still missing in many rural places of the country. The Colombian campesinos have been relegated to live on poor soils with low productivity. This lack of social investment in infrastructure and basic services make Colombian peasants individuals without opportunities. The lack of law enforcement over the forest by government agencies with limited resources in remote places and large areas give place to forest destruction. Illicit crops surge is a good economic alternative for poor people in rural areas.


Consequences


This illegal business, promoted, financed and run by armed groups in Colombia (FARC, ELN and paramilitares) has caused catastrophic social, economic and environmental impacts in the country.


Environmental Impacts


Little research exists on environmental effects of illicit crops and illegal drugs processing in developing countries. Most of the data related to this issue come from police and government reports. “The environmental consequences of armed conflict have received little scientific study, and except for petroleum spill damage, are unknown” (6). Agricultural shifting cultivation has been traditionally one of the main causes of deforestation in Colombia. Illicit agriculture per se has already been identified as a major factor in forest degradation (Alvarez 2003 (6)).


The national police of Colombia estimate that for the establishment of 1 hectare of coca plantings, 3 hectares of natural forest are destroyed (1). This action implies the reduction and disappearing of genetic resources and the environmental impact on water streams, fauna and soils. Near 2.3 million ha of forests in Peru have been cut to plant illicit crops of coca. In Colombia 1.3 million ha of natural forests have been cut for coca and poppy plantings between 1990 and 2000 (4). Additional effects to forest destruction are forest fragmentation and fauna displacement (16).


Alvarez (6) mentions three kinds of fragmentation pressures of forested areas near illicit crops:


  • High economic incentives for expanding illicit crops.
  • Forests are cut to grow coca and poppy plants.
  • Eradication by the government may lead growers to move deeper into the forest to avoid detection.


Attacks by paramilitares facilitate the expansion of cattle ranches and/or the consolidation of lands held by traffickers. “Because the paramilitares are mercenaries for cattle ranchers and traffickers, landholdings usurped from guerrilla territories are quickly consolidated. The conversion of the last forest remnants to cattle ranches often follows territorial gains made by the paramilitares”.


Insecticides, fungicides and herbicides are applied in most of the illicit crops in a negligent way in many cases. Evidence of illegal use of chemicals like Parathion and organoclorides has been found by police in coca and poppy plantings (16). Looking for high income, many coca growers apply large amounts of highly toxic herbicides such as paraquat and endosulfan, both of which are legally forbidden for sale within the U.S. and Colombia (17). “A report from the National Agrarian University in Lima, Peru estimated that as much as 600 million liters of so-called precursor chemicals are used annually in South America for cocaine production” (17). Pollution of water sources and soils result from these activities. Erosion of soils is also present after forest burning (16). Biodiversity is also disturbed, but this impact has not been assessed.


Cocaine processing labs are installed by drug dealers close to water bodies, throwing the chemical residues into the water streams. Within the toxic and pollutant chemical agents used for processing cocaine are potassium permanganate, sulfuric and hydrochloric acids, ammonium hydroxide, ethyl acetate and gasoline (1).


Economic


No economic value has been given to the destruction of forests, contamination of water bodies, erosion of soils and other environmental damage. These externalities should be taken into account as part of the cost of illicit crops establishment and management.


Despite the value added estimate for Colombia of 2.5 billion dollars (10), the economy of the country has not been improved or favored by this market. The economic and institutional price paid by the country for this war is very high. Some of these costs are: army and police personnel and equipment, jails, deaths, kidnappings, attacks on the infrastructure of the country, displacement of peasants, unemployment growth with small businesses leaving the market, increase of corruption in government institutions, and increase in the judicial and policy development activities (14). “The cost of crime in terms of lost economic growth exceeded 2 percent per year, without including its longer term effects on factor productivity and capital formation” (Thomi (10)).


The medium and long term effects of this illegal industry in the economy of Colombia have been highly negative. Even though the large economic groups of the country stayed separate of illegal activities, and so have their bank accounts, leaving a small room for money laundry, the drug dealers have found ways to make investments in the formal economy. “The illicit industry became a main immediate cause of the current Colombian social crises and also contributes to the destruction of productive activities and to capital flight” (10).


Social


The forests that are cut for the establishment of illicit crops are usually growing in poor soils. Most of the plant nutrients are present in the biomass of the trees. Once the trees are cut, the recycled nutrients are lost in the case of tree production or coca and poppy crops. The soils in the region are best suited for forestry. Agricultural products have limited possibilities and no chance to compete with coca and poppy crops. Government programs should be designed to use the forests and its products as it is the best socio-economic alternative for the rural populations who live in these areas.


Social effects of illicit crops are perhaps the most visible, with the worst consequences in the long term. There is massive displacement of the rural population towards large cities to avoid the risk of being murdered in locations where they can hardly assume a neutral position in a local conflict. According to the United Nations, Colombia is the third country in the world with the most number of people displaced by violence, only after Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Groups that have been most widely affected are communal leaders, people in rural areas, native peoples, and African-Colombians. The displacement violates many rights, including the right to life and physical integrity, to education, to work, and to a house in decent condition. The social capital is debilitated, just the same as the institutions and their values (12).


The communities that take part in the establishment and management of illicit crops undergo a cultural change with a deep effect on their social structures and values. A new mentality for fast income and enrichment at any cost is generated, causing the development of alcoholism, prostitution, and drug addiction. Violence within the family increases, especially the abuse of women and children. Homicides, kidnappings, and disappearances are other forms of crime that affect the involved communities. Large amounts of cash bring other problems such as inflation, and never generate stable development within the communities. In this way, what apparently could be a better economic alternative ends up becoming a greater problem.


Health care and food conditions in places where illicit crops are grown are very poor, especially for children. Malnutrition is rising as a result of growing coca because it has encouraged people to abandon food crops. Mortality rate for children is higher in areas with coca plantings than in any other urban or rural area (8). Furthermore, “Drug use fosters crime; facilitates the spread of catastrophic health problems, such as hepatitis, endocarditis, and AIDS; and disrupts personal, familial, and legitimate economic relationships” (9).


Government Plans and Policy


The catastrophic environmental, economic and social consequences of the illegal drug business can only be eliminated through the use of well defined government policies and well implemented strategies between consumer and producer countries. Reduction of consumption and production of illegal drugs should be the focus of joint actions between the involved nations.


Currently, there is a long term coordinated effort between the governments of U.S. and Colombia “Plan Colombia” to eliminate drug trafficking and promote economic and social development. The main goals of this plan are: reduce production and distribution of illegal drugs and dismantle terrorist organizations, build and strengthen public institutions and increase State presence throughout Colombia, revitalize the economy, and advance the Colombian peace process (3). Several actions that go from manual eradication and fumigation to promotion of alternative crops are part of the tactics and the strategies in place. Interdiction, labs, chemicals and weapons destruction, extradition and projects for social and community infrastructure are also part of the actions in the plan execution. Modernization of police and armed forces, as well as strengthening of the judicial system is required to guarantee a fair and quick control of illegal actions.


There has been decrease in violence and progress in the eradication of drugs crops (2). The current Colombian government has demobilized 30,000 paramilitares and 7,000 guerilla troops in its effort to end the narco-war. Reactivation of the economy of the country and reduction in crime has been documented by the Colombian government during the last 5 years. Although the future is uncertain, the continuous effort and cooperation of the governments of Colombia and the U.S. will likely reduce the consequences of this business significantly.


Socio-economic alternatives have to be provided to the population of rural areas in Colombia, even if they have to be subsidized in the long term, to be able to compete with such a profitable activity as the illegal drug business. These broader government initiatives are now being promoted by the United Nations and by many emerging forestry initiatives, loosely termed Forest Law and Governance initiatives. Their focus is to provide better government protection and infrastructure to protect and manage forests and enhance social development in forested areas. It is only through the cooperative efforts of local people, national governments, and international cooperation that illegal activities in forests can be supplanted with viable means to earn livelihoods and protect forests, their residents and owners, and their benefits.


References


(1) Ministerio de Defensa Nacional, República de Colombia, Abril 2002. Destrozos ambientales del narcotráfico.


(2) CRS Report for Congress. Plan Colombia, A Progress Report, June 22, 2005. Connie Veillette, Analist in Latin American Affairs. Congressional Research Service. The Library of Congress.


(3) Embassy of Colombia, Washington. Plan Colombia – results to date. 2003.


(4) Paola Dobriansky, US Embassy in Montevideo, Uruguay. Do you want to save the tropical forests? Do not take illicit drugs.


(5) FAO, Noticias. La FAO ayuda a Bolivia a luchar contra el comercio de la coca. Internet.


(6) Alvarez, Maria D, 2003. Forests in the Time of Violence: Conservation Implications of the Colombian War. The Howarth Press Inc.


(7) Fjeldsa J, Alvarez M, Lazcano JM, León B. 2005. Illicit Crops and Armed Conflict as Constraints on Biodiversity Conservation in the Andes Region. Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences. Ambio Vol. 34, No. 3, May 2005.


(8) Gonzalez, D. 2000. Coca, Deforestation and food security in the Colombian Amazon Region. Unasylva 202: 32-36. Published 2000.


(9) Office of National Drug Control Policy, 2001. What America’s Users Spend on Illegal Drugs 1988-2000.


(10) Thoumi, Francisco. 2002. Illegal Drugs in Colombia: From Illegal Economic Boom to Social Crisis. THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY.


(11) Unicef Colombia. Webpage. Situación de la Infancia – Trabajo Infantil.


(12) Navarrete, C. and Thoumi, F. 2005. Illegal Drugs and Human Rights of Peasants and Indigenous Communities: The Case of Colombia. Policy Papers/15. UNESCO 2005.


(13) Reuter, P. and Greenfield Victoria. Measuring Global Drug Markets. How good are the numbers and why should we care about them? World Economics. Vol. 2. No. 4. October-December 2001.


(14) Echeverry, J.C. Colombia and the war on drugs, how short is the short run? Documento CEDE 2004-13 ISSN 1657-7191 (Edición Electrónica) Febrero del 2004. Department of Economics – CEDE, Universidad de Los Andes, Bogotá.


(15) Caulkins, Jonathan P.; Reuter, Peter. What Price Data Tell Us About Drug Markets. Journal of Drug Issues, Summer 98, Vol. 28 Issue 3, p593-612, 20p.


(16) Los Cultivos Ilícitos en Colombia. Subdirección de Asuntos Regionales y Erradicación. Dirección Nacional de Estupefacientes. 2004. Internet: http://www.cultivosilicitoscolombia.gov.co/documentos/CultivosIlicitos/CultivosIlicitos.htm


(17) Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs. March 2003. Environmental Consequences of the Illicit Coca Trade. Fact Sheet. Washington, DC. Internet: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/3807.htm


Posted: 28 May 2007

Updated: 23 August 2007

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